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THE VIOXX LITIGATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT
TRIAL TACTICS, THE TORT SYSTEM, AND THE
ROLES OF LAWYERS IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
Frank M. McClellan*

INTRODUCTION

On November 9, 2007, Merck & Co., the executive committee of
the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee of the federal multidistrict, and
plaintiffs' counsel representatives agreed to settle the Vioxx litigation.1 The plaintiffs' lawyers were charged with obtaining the acceptance of at least 85% of Vioxx plaintiffs before the settlement goes into
effect. 2 If the required number of plaintiffs accept the settlement, it is
estimated that each plaintiff who qualifies-by presenting adequate
proof that Vioxx caused a heart attack, stroke, or death-will receive
an average payment of between $100,000 and $200,000, less attorneys'
3
fees ranging from 331/3% to 40%.
Merck's settlement announcement highlighted a number of key
provisions. To qualify for compensation, claimants must offer objective medical proof that they suffered a heart attack or stroke after
taking at least thirty Vioxx pills and show that the injury took place
* Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple University. I would like to thank Professors Alberto Bernabe, Phoebe A. Haddon. and Robert Rabin for providing critical comments on
earlier versions of this Article. I also want to express my appreciation to Professor Stephan
Landsman for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and for commenting on and criticizing the draft at the Clifford Symposium. None of these fine scholars had an opportunity to see
this Article in its final form, and I want to absolve them from responsibility for the views expressed and any mistakes made in the factual and legal analysis.
1. Press Release, Merck Agreement to Resolve U.S. VIOXX® Product Liability Lawsuits:
Agreement Provides for $4.85 Billion Payment (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.merck.
com/newsroom/press releases/corporate/2007_1109_print.html [hereinafter Merck Settlement].
2. Id.
3. The average payment will depend on the number of plaintiffs who ultimately qualify to
participate in the distribution in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. Alex
Berenson, a reporter who has followed the litigation closely for several years, stated that
"[diepending on how many claims are filed to the settlement fund, those people will receive
payments averaging about $120,000 each before legal fees and expenses, which could swallow
about 40 percent of their payments." Alex Berenson, Analysts See Merck Victory in Vioxx Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at Al. The average may be as high as $200,000 if only about
18,000 to 20,000 of the 45,000 people involved in the cases qualify. Karl Stark, Merck Offers
Billions for Vioxx: The Deal, Worth Up to $4.85 Billion, Would Settle 26,000 Suits Over the Discontinued Pain Reliever, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 10, 2007, at A01.
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within fourteen days of taking Vioxx. Administrators will be appointed to determine whether individual cases qualify. In addition,
the agreement provides that Merck does not admit causation or fault.
Finally, the settlement agreement provides that law firms on the federal and state Plaintiffs' Steering Committees and firms that have
tried cases in the coordinated proceedings are required to recommend
enrollment in the program to 100% of their clients who allege either
myocardial infarction (MI) or ischemic stroke. These lawyers and law
firms are also prohibited from continuing to represent nonparticipat4
ing plaintiffs.
The settlement followed the trial of fourteen cases that resulted in
nine wins for Merck and five wins for plaintiffs. 5 Throughout the
course of the litigation, Merck vowed to "try every case" and backed
its public litigation posture by paying millions of dollars in legal fees
and other trial expenses, while running an extensive advertising campaign touting Merck's contributions to public health. The settlement
reflects a tremendous victory for Merck, because the company's potential liability exposure was projected to be substantially higher.
Wall Street rewarded Merck with a rise in its stock prices the day after
the settlement was announced. 6 Merck and the plaintiffs' lawyers explained to the public that the settlement made pragmatic sense in light
of the uncertainty of the outcomes that would follow trying over
27,000 cases one at time.
Merck's successful employment of a try-every-case strategy to produce a settlement much lower than expected reveals a glaring deficiency in the legal system's ability to achieve the fundamental goals of
tort law in prescription drug cases where large numbers of consumers
suffer adverse reactions to the same drug. If other corporations with
vast financial resources follow Merck's lead, the disparate economic
interests among the rich corporation, plaintiffs' lawyers, and injured
consumers is likely to result in pragmatic decision making on the part
of the business stakeholders that minimizes the importance of individual justice. The strategy of trying every case and making plaintiffs'
4. Merck Settlement, supra note 1.
5. As discussed below, an evaluation of the economic, ethical, moral, and justice issues that
flow out of this litigation and the proposed settlement must take into account not only the winloss ratio of the cases that were tried, but also that the plaintiffs who prevailed won jury verdicts
awarding them millions of dollars. The plaintiffs who lost had difficulty persuading the jury that
Vioxx, rather than other preexisting conditions, caused their injuries.
6. See Berenson, supra note 3 (noting that two years ago some analysts projected that Merck
would have to pay close to $25 billion to settle the Vioxx claims). The reaction to the announced
settlement of $4.85 billion "represents only about nine months of profit for Merck, whose stock
rose 2.3 percent on news of the agreement, even as the broader stock market was sharply lower."
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lawyers accept the reality of costly litigation over an extended period
of time transforms plaintiffs' lawyers from zealous advocates to pragmatic entrepreneurs. From a pragmatic business perspective, achieving individual justice seems much less important than garnering a
settlement tailored toward global considerations and a return on an
investment.
A settlement of serious injury claims at a fraction of their potential
verdict value is preferable to the uncertainty and time associated with
relying on a lethargic, underfunded, and overburdened court system
to resolve thousands of cases, whether one looks through the eyes of
the judges, the corporate defendant, or the plaintiffs' lawyers. However, from the perspective of a consumer seeking just compensation
for a tort injury, the Vioxx settlement sends a message that plaintiffs'
lawyers, no matter how rich and skillful, cannot produce just compensation for the harm a defective drug consumer sustained if too many
consumers were hurt by the same defective product. The impact of
Merck's strategy on the individual consumer's expectation of independent legal counsel and representation is blatantly exposed by the provision in the settlement agreement that each counsel participating in
the settlement must recommend acceptance to all of his clients and
further advise them that they must seek representation by another
7
lawyer if they do not participate.
This Article reviews the history of and continuing activity in the
Vioxx litigation in light of the goals of tort law-deterrence, corrective
justice, and social justice-and argues that policymakers should adopt
new judicial tools and remedies to discourage parties and lawyers
from minimizing the importance of individual consumers' needs and
expectations in mass tort prescription drug litigation. Specifically, this
Article explores whether the court system has an effective means of
managing mass tort cases where individual questions of causation
predominate over common issues of liability and a wealthy corporate
defendant insists on trying every case and makes no effort to settle,
regardless of the strength of the claim or the defense. 8 After review7. As some lawyers have already acknowledged by filing a petition to revise this provision, a
client's right to independent representation and advice is substantially undermined. See Alex
Berenson, Lawyers Seek to Alter Settlement Over Vioxx N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at C4.
8. Defendants in mass torts brought over the past three decades have at first adopted a strategy of litigating every case, only to capitulate to mass settlement efforts as the litigation
progressed. Examples are found in the asbestos, tobacco, and Bendectin litigations. For full
discussions of the histories of these mass tort cases, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT (1985) (describing the history of asbestos litigation); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN
AND BIRTH DEFECTS:

THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES

LITIGATION

(1996);

SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman

eds., 1993).
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ing the rules and precedents applicable to class actions and the sanctions available to control the conduct of a litigant who insists on a
trial, this Article concludes that courts currently lack an effective
mechanism to control such a strategy. The best they can do is use the
power of persuasion and impose Rule 11 sanctions, 9 neither of which
is likely to be an effective deterrent, because the financial penalties
are too low when they are limited to costs and attorneys' fees. The
lack of an adequate judicial remedy represents a serious deficiency in
a tort system that is required to process mass tort claims.
For the purpose of clarifying the values and policies at stake, it does
not matter whether the November 9 settlement is finalized or breaks
down. The problem of providing corrective justice to seriously injured
individuals remains. The plaintiffs' inability to try every case or litigate the cases as a class action leaves them at the mercy of the practical economic judgments that Merck and the plaintiffs' contingent fee
attorneys will make. If the settlement proposal fails to garner the required 85% approval, the plaintiffs will be right back where they
started, awaiting trial and hoping that their attorneys have the will and
resources to continue litigating for years. If Merck follows through on
its stated intention to litigate every case for another five years, it is
apparent that plaintiffs' attorneys will not continue to represent them.
Otherwise, the attorneys would not have signed an agreement obligating them to take steps to withdraw from representing clients who are
unwilling to accept the settlement. On the other hand, if the settlement does not go through and plaintiffs are able to find new attorneys
to represent them, the litigation may continue for ten to fifteen more
years.' 0 This picture should disturb lawyers, judges, and the general
public enough to make them critically rethink and reformulate some
of the fundamental procedural and ethical rules applicable to mass
tort trials involving prescription drugs." This Article argues that this
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
10. The time required to try 27,000 Vioxx claims will depend upon court and juror availability,
as well as innovative strategies employed by judges. See Sandra Mazer Moss, Response to Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute from a State Judge's
Perspective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1573 (1994) (discussing the creative techniques state and federal
courts used to expedite the resolution of asbestos claims). Vioxx claims do not present the threat
or burden of longevity that asbestos claims imposed on the court system, because there are fewer
Vioxx claims, and these do not include many consumers who will bring claims in the future for
latent injuries. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem
and Orbitz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899 (2002) (discussing the challenge posed by the high number of
future claimants in the asbestos mass tort context, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court
ordered a decertification of the settlement class).
11. This Article presents an analysis based on the author's academic research and publications
pertaining to tort theory and drug product liability claims, as well the author's practical experience as a tort litigator. See, e.g., Frank M. McClellan, Bendectin Revisited: Is There a Right to a
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is a serious deficiency in the system that cries out for reform-for instance, such as the enactment of a rule or statute that subjects defendants to a monetary penalty, such as treble damages, similar to the
approach taken in many jurisdictions to control the conduct of insurance companies that act in bad faith. In addition, the Vioxx litigation
demonstrates the harm that has been done to mass tort plaintiffs by
the narrowing and elimination of class action rules over the past
decade.
An examination of the moral and ethical implications of Merck's
litigation strategy supports the argument that there is a pressing need
for a financial penalty to deter bad faith refusals to settle in mass tort
situations. This Article assesses the impact of this strategy in light of
the public's interest in maintaining a system of law that achieves justice for individuals in mass tort situations.12 If the proposed settlement breaks down and Merck uses its vast resources to try 27,000
cases one at a time, this strategy will ultimately clash with the public's
interest in maintaining a court system capable of resolving mass tort
13
claims in a fair and efficient manner.
While the ethical rules applicable to Merck's attorneys do not specifically preclude this strategy, there will be instances where the lawyer's duty of candor to the court will require careful client counseling
and decisions whether to acknowledge that the position taken does
not rest on persuasive evidence. This is likely to occur particularly in
the settlement conferences that courts have come to rely upon to re14
solve a large percentage of cases immediately prior to trial.
Jury Trial in an Age of JudicialGatekeeping?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 261 (1998); Frank M. McClellan et al., Strict Liability for PrescriptionDrug Injuries: The Improper Marketing Theory, 26 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1 (1981); Frank M. McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L.
REV. 1 (1978). For examples of the author's practical experience as a tort litigator, see In re
Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); McDaniel v. Merck, 533 A.2d 436 (Pa. 1987);
Stanton v. Astra PharmaceuticalProducts, Inc., 718 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1983).
12. For an in-depth discussion of the court system's current attempts to balance efficiency with
individual justice, see THOMAS H. KOENING & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW
(2001) (emphasizing the importance of using tort law to achieve corrective justice). See also
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995).
13. The author acknowledges at the outset that the Vioxx litigation does not yet represent a
"mature tort," therefore the emerging picture may change dramatically over the next few years.
See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659. 659 (1989)
(describing a mature tort as one where "there has been full and complete discovery, multiple
verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions").
14. Empirical studies show that 97% of civil cases never reach trial and that a significant
percentage of filed cases are settled. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996). My experience as a trial lawyer and consultant to trial lawyers
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PRESETTLEMENT

PERSPECTIVES AND POSTURES

In the spring of 2000, Vioxx was approved for marketing as a painkiller and took the market by storm, quickly becoming chief competitor to Celebrex-a painkiller that had already established a market
niche. Merck marketed Vioxx-in the United States and abroadfrom the time of its FDA approval in 2000 to September 30, 2004,
when it voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market.1 5 By 2003, Vioxx was sold around the world, and Merck's sales were reportedly $2.5
billion.' 6 Unfortunately for Merck, a medical study revealed that Vioxx users had a significantly increased chance of suffering a stroke or
heart attack, 17 and Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market. Plaintiffs'
lawyers and the media immediately raised questions regarding the
risks posed by Vioxx, as well as when Merck knew or should have
known of the risks. Indeed, even prior to Merck's withdrawal of Vioxx from the market, one plaintiffs' firm had already filed 300 Vioxx
lawsuits.18 Merck knew it had to prepare for an onslaught of
thousands more personal injury claims, so it immediately made a preemptive strike aimed at influencing public opinion. It held a press
conference on October 1, 2004, at which the president of Merck Research Laboratories explained the timeline of events that produced
medical studies that caused Merck to become concerned enough
about the risks of Vioxx to take the drug off the market.' 9
Anticipating the avalanche of lawsuits shortly after the disclosure of
the increased risk of heart attacks and strokes,2 0 Merck vowed to try
every Vioxx case filed against it.21 Merck's defense would rely upon
evidence that it had produced a desirable and effective product and
leads me to conclude that a large percentage of cases involving serious injuries settle as a result
of some type of settlement conference held before the trial is scheduled to begin. At this time.,
the trial judge plays the most active role in facilitating candid discussions between the parties
pertaining to the risks of a trial and the benefits of a settlement.
15. Pamela Kropf. Making Sense of the Vioxx Mess, THE PHARMACIST. Mar. 2007, at 9.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 9.

18. See Barnaby J. Feder, Lawyers Organizing for Mass Suits Over Vioxx. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2004, at Cl.
19. Kropf, supra note 15, at 7.
20. See Omri Ben-Shahar. The (Legal) Pains of Vioxx: Why Product Liability Can Make
Products More Dangerous, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, June 2006, at 1, http://www.bepress.com/ev/

vol3/iss6/art6/ (arguing that the liability system deters companies such as Merck from taking
post-marketing product safety measures, because observers view these remedial measures as a
public confession of responsibility for harm).
21. Thomas Ginsberg, 47.5 Million Vioxx Award Against Merck: The Drug Company Plans to
File an Appeal in the Case of a Man Who Suffered a Heart Attack, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 13,

2007. at Cl.
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acted in a reasonable and timely manner in warning consumers about
the known risks of Vioxx. 2 2 Moreover, Merck emphasized that there
are numerous causes of heart attacks and strokes and that the mere
coincidence of using Vioxx at the time a person suffered a heart attack
or stroke does not meet the legal standard requiring each victim to
prove more probably than not that Vioxx caused his injuries. Further,
Merck noted that the studies showing an increased risk of harm associated with Vioxx related to long-term users and not to many of the
potential claimants who had used the drug for a few months before
suffering a heart attack.
One Vioxx trial that resulted in a substantial plaintiff's verdict in
March 2007 reflects the basic themes that litigants and lawyers have
publicly repeated from the litigation's beginning. A jury in Atlantic
City, New Jersey awarded $20 million dollars in compensatory damages and $27.5 million dollars in punitive damages to sixty-one-yearold Frederick Humelston, who used Vioxx for two months before suffering a heart attack.2 3 In their public statements, both the attorneys
and the litigants focused on the significance of this verdict in light of
the other cases. Counsel for Merck sought to reinforce the Company's argument that science does not support a finding that shortterm use of Vioxx causes heart attacks and strokes: "We believe Mr.
Humelston would have suffered a heart attack whether he was taking
Vioxx or not. We will pursue all avenues of appeal. ' 24 A well-known
Philadelphia plaintiffs' attorney, who was not the trial lawyer in the
Humelston case, but who represents 2,000 plaintiffs with Vioxx claims,
asserted the following: "Merck will win from time to time. But when
the plaintiff wins, the jury wallops them. ' 25 A news article reported
that the Vioxx litigation cost Merck $1 million a day, but Wall Street
analysts projected that a settlement of all of the cases could cost
Merck as much as $30 billion. 26 Responding to this, a pharmaceutical
22. Id.
23. Id. It is noteworthy that this case was tried a year earlier in Atlantic City, New Jersey. and
resulted in a verdict for Merck. However, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial based
on evidentiary errors. At the new trial, plaintiffs were able to introduce new evidence that
Merck omitted material information about the risks of Vioxx as revealed in a published study.
Gregory D. Curfman et al., Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al, "'Comparisonof Upper
Gastroeintestinal Toxicity of Rocefecoxib and Naproxen in Patient with Rheumatoid Arthritis," N

Eng J Med 2000; 343:1520-8, 353 N. ENO. J. MED. 2813 (2005). The editors conclude that the
2000 report of the VIGOR study as published in the New England Journal of Medicine presents
"inaccuracies and deletions [that] call into question the integrity of the data on adverse cardiovascular events in this article." Id. at 2814.
24. Ginsberg, supra note 21.
25. Id.

26. Id.
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defense lawyer declared that the litigation costs were far too low to
justify a change in tactics from trying cases to settling them: "You
could go a lot of days at $1 million a day before getting to $30
27
billion."
By the time a settlement was proposed in November 2007, Merck
faced more than 27,000 product liability claims in federal and state
courts. 28 Until the agreed upon mass tort settlement, Merck had not
settled a single claim and had won jury verdicts in nine of the fourteen
cases that proceeded to trial. 29 These tort claims shared the basic allegation that Vioxx posed an increased risk of cardiovascular incidents,
such as heart attacks and strokes, and that Merck, despite knowledge
of those risks, failed to give an adequate and timely warning to consumers and their physicians. 30 These cases differed in that the plaintiffs used the drug for different lengths of time and had different
medical histories, presenting varying degrees of heart attack and
stroke risks caused by factors other than Vioxx. 3 ' Merck admitted
that studies show that Vioxx use over a period of eighteen months
increased cardiovascular risks but denied that these studies showed an
32
increased risk to consumers who used it for only a few months.
27. Id.
28. Kropf, supra note 15; see also Alex Berenson. Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at Al.
29. Kropf, supra note 15.
30. For a comprehensive discussion of the claims of wrongdoing on the part of Merck, and a
rejection of the merits of those claims, see DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON L.L.P., REPORT OF THE
HONORABLE JOHN S. MARTIN, JR. TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECrORS

OF MERCK & Co., INC. CONCERNING THE CONDuCr OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOP-

MENT AND MARKETING OF VIOXX (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/
vioxx/pdf/001_-0 1report of the honorable__john-s-martinj r-introduction.pdf [hereinafter
MARTIN REPORT]. See also David Voreacos & Angela Zimm, Merck Handled Vioxx 'With Integrity,' Study Concludes (Update 2), BLOOMBERO.COM, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=AOM3UKAWUK3g&refer=news#.
31. See Berenson, supra note 28 (discussing the variation in the claims of injuries allegedly
caused by Vioxx and noting that trial judges have rejected class action requests because of the
variation of material facts in the cases).
32. For a succinct timeline of the studies revealing the cardiovascular injury risk associated
with Vioxx and Merck's responses to the information, see W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story:
Would it Have Ended Differently in the European Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365 (2006). See
also Amanda J.Dohrman, Rethinking and Restructuring the FDA Drug Approval Process in
Light of the Vioxx Recall, 31 J. CORP. L. 203 (2005) (reviewing the facts surrounding the recall of
Vioxx and arguing for the need to restructure the FDA to identify drug dangers more quickly to
avoid consumer injuries); Jonathan V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the
Argument Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective
Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (2006) (reviewing the process by which Merck marketed and then
removed Vioxx from the market and arguing that the threat of litigation provides an important
deterrent to the marketing of unsafe products).
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Merck focused its defense on the lack of proof of causation. 33 By Au34
gust 2007, Merck spent more than $1 billion in legal fees.
In the final analysis, courts will find that they lack effective means
to compel a well-financed corporation to engage in settlement negotiations and good-faith evidence evaluations-especially in a mass tort
case, where the corporation makes a cost-benefit analysis that supports a try-every-case strategy. In order for the tort system to promote corrective justice, social justice, and deterrence in mass tort
cases, 35 Merck's try-every-case tactic demands reconsideration of the
36
ways in which mass tort claims are handled.
Merck, or a similarly situated corporation faced with thousands of
tort claims, may rationalize this strategy on the basis of a corporation's duty to its shareholders to maximize profits. Faced with
thousands of claims, many of which are defensible, it is understandable that Merck would adopt a strategy that it believes will minimize its
exposure by discouraging additional claims. If the insistence on trying
every case persists for hundreds or thousands of trials or, in the alternative, persists long enough to induce a global settlement far below
the value of the collective meritorious cases, the consequences to the
justice system will be intolerable.
Viewing the Vioxx litigation as primarily a fight between rich,
greedy plaintiffs' lawyers seeking more money and a rich corporation
seeking to preserve its assets causes one to miss a critical point. The
important fight is between thousands of consumers who claim to have
suffered heart attacks and strokes and a corporation that revised the
warning on its drug's labeling and withdrew the drug from the market,
but, nevertheless, contends that the drug caused no harm. It is troubling that there is no viable mechanism or procedure that allows the
vast majority of these individual consumers to resolve their cases on
the merits in a fair and timely manner, when many of them are in
desperate need of compensation-being dependent upon wage earnings and having little in savings-and in all probability have meritorious claims.
33. See Kropf, supra note 15.
34. See Berenson, supra note 3.
35. For a discussion of these tort theories, see THOMAS C.
CASES, PERSPECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS

1-47 (4th ed. 2007); and

GALLIGAN ET AL., TORT LAW:
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF

TORTS 1-21 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
36. The existing rules governing class action litigation will not allow the courts to compel a
fast resolution of a large number of claims on their merits. Moreover, the remedies available to
victims aimed at dissuading wealthy corporations from trying every case in future mass torts
lacks sufficient punch. A more stringent financial penalty is necessary to encourage good-faith
conduct in this type of litigation.
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The primary goal of the tort system is to provide individuals with an
opportunity for compensation for personal injuries in a timely manner, particularly those individuals who lack the resources to protect
their future through the advance purchase of property, life, disability,
and health insurance. 37 Merck's trial strategy in the Vioxx litigation
seriously threatens the goals of corrective and social justice. 38 Increased litigation costs and delayed compensation decisions on meritorious cases cannot be condoned on the mere basis of the right to a
vigorous defense in the adversarial justice system.
III.

MASS TORT LITIGATION

In a thoughtful book discussing mass tort litigation, 39 Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, a highly regarded trial judge who presided over the Agent
Orange litigation and many other mass tort trials, made the following
observation: "When an attorney undertakes what is in essence a public litigation, he or she must be prepared for financial destruction as
well as glory. The issues transcend traditional one client-one attorney
'40
relationships and conflicts. They involve whole communities.
Jonathan Harr's book, A Civil Action, highlighted many of the
troublesome economic, psychological, and cultural aspects of mass
tort cases involving whole communities. 41 A Civil Action presents the
story of individuals and families who sought compensation for numerous children who contracted leukemia while living in a small Massa37. Mark Rahdert provides a succinct explanation of the rationale for compensation as a
prime goal of the tort system:
Compensating victims of one kind or another is one of the major undertakings of government in our society .... It would seem strange for a society that finds the value of
compensation through cost spreading so appealing in other domains to deny its significance in a legal system that deals explicitly and almost exclusively with injury. If the
victims of tortious injury were grouped together as victims of some single mass disaster,
we would surely recognize the legitimacy of their claims for compensation, as we have
for the victims of Hurricane Andrew and the 1993 Mississippi and Missouri River
Floods.
MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND TORT REFORM

180 (1995).
38. The Vioxx litigation is distinguishable from both the Bendectin litigation, which presented
serious scientific questions as to whether the drug caused the claimants' injuries, and the asbestos litigation, where multiple defendants were properly held responsible for the injury-causing
asbestos. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); GREEN, supra note 8. See also
Hensler, supra note 10, at 1923 (observing that tort goals of deterrence and justice were served
by the initial asbestos litigation, but not in the latter stages, because "as more and more companies with less and less connection to asbestos production [were] drawn into the litigation, the
corrective justice and deterrence arguments in favor of litigation [became] weaker").
39. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12.

40. Id. at 63.
41. JONATHAN

HAAR,

A

CIVIL ACTION

(1995).
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chusetts town. The families believed that drinking water
contaminated by two companies that illegally dumped toxic substances into the town's wells caused the illnesses. 42 The book begins
with a description of the repossession of the plaintiffs' lawyer's
Porsche and later emphasizes that the lawyer and other members of
his law firm risked every asset they possessed in an effort to prove that
the defendant corporations caused their clients' injuries. 43 In the end,
a conscientious but confused jury rendered a verdict on the initial
phase of the case that prompted the plaintiffs to settle for monetary
compensation substantially less than they and their attorneys had
44
anticipated.
Many other mass tort claims brought over the past two decades
have presented similar challenges to the legal system, revealing the
need to reassess the ability of procedural and substantive tort law
rules to promote the just resolution of mass tort claims.4 5 Under the
traditional tort rules and methods of client representation, the effectiveness of the system in prosecuting tort claims, individually or in the
aggregate, depends on private attorney-entrepreneurs who have the
resources to advance enormous litigation costs and work on contingency. As observed by Judge Weinstein and depicted in A Civil Action, the traditional tort paradigm of providing compensation to an
individual victim who suffered harm due to a single tortious act does
not work efficiently, or in many cases fairly, when applied to mass tort
actions.
Because mass tort cases involve enormous costs-both in litigation
expenses and attorney labor-plaintiffs' attorneys cannot prosecute
mass tort cases and maintain the same type of attorney-client relationship with each client as they do in ordinary tort cases. 46 Neither can
defendants' attorneys evaluate and respond to each individual case as
they would if there were only a few claimants. It takes considerable
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Judge Weinstein provides citations to numerous opinions he wrote in mass tort cases up to
April 1994 that concerned injuries caused by the following: Agent Orange, asbestos, DES, Repetitive Stress and Health, Lilco-Atomic Plant, and insecticides. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, at
xv-xvii. For a comprehensive collection of cases and authorities on mass torts, see LINDA S.
MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION; CASES AND MATERIALS (1996). See also Deborah R. Hen-

sler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass PersonalInjury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993).

46. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 1913. Based on an in-depth review of the asbestos litigation,
Hensler argued that whether the plaintiffs in mass tort claims were represented in a class action
or by aggregate methods, "individual treatment of asbestos cases-with individual plaintiffs controlling the course of their litigation and the decision to settle-was largely a myth." Id.
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time and expense to determine which cases among the many potential
claims are strong and which are weak. Consequently, mass tort claims
expose clients and their lawyers to intense new pressures, and their
responses to those pressures have a substantial, cognizable impact
upon the community at large. As the toxic waste litigation described
in A Civil Action illustrates, 47 the enormous costs in money, time, and
emotion required to determine whether the defendants have engaged
in conduct or sold a product that caused harm to large numbers of
consumers poses a constant threat of overwhelming litigants, courts,
48
and juries.
Lawyers representing parties in mass tort actions also face new ethical issues as they attempt to develop effective litigation strategies. At
the forefront is the issue of how to respond to the impact of publicity
about the large number of potential injuries and the lawsuits that such
publicity is likely to engender. 49 Defendants are compelled to quickly
decide how much information to share with the public about the product's dangers, while balancing the need to reduce future injuries with a
desire to minimize incentives to past product users to bring lawsuits.
Also at stake is the public's perception of the product's safety-a matter that will affect the perspective of potential jurors who will resolve
any claims that are not settled. Defendants have to decide whether to
adopt a public posture aimed at a fast resolution that encourages aggregate settlements or a posture of fighting to the end in defense of
the product and the corporation's conduct. Most defendants have
adopted a middle ground, litigating a few test cases to see how juries
respond to the claims and defenses and then pursuing some type of
aggregate settlement. 50 However, no matter what strategy the defendant embraces, mass tort cases place unusual demands on the court
system, subjecting it to intense critical analysis regarding its ability to
achieve justice in a modern economy. It is not surprising, therefore,
47. See HAAR, supra note 41.

48. See Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721
(2002); Hensler, supra note 10; see also BRODEUR, supra note 8.
49. The Vioxx litigation has produced a pervasive flow of public statements from lawyers on
both sides. See, e.g., Larry Smith, Merck's Powerful Tactical Advantage in the Court of Public
Opinion, 25 OF COUNSEL 12 (Nov. 2006) (discussing a gag order issued by a federal judge in the
fourth federal Vioxx trial in New Orleans and arguing that the gag order gave Merck an advantage because Merck continued to run image ads arguing that Vioxx is safe and Merck is a wonderful company).
50. For a description of the litigation history of four different mass torts, see Lawrence T.
Hoyle, Jr. & Edward W. Madeira, Jr., "The PhiladelphiaStory": Mass Torts in the City of Brotherly Love, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 119 (2001) (recounting the history of mass tort litigation in multidistrict litigation transferred to Philadelphia courts involving the following: asbestos,
orthopedic bone screws, latex gloves, and diet drug products (fen/phen)).
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that mass tort cases precipitate public debate about the need for tort
reform.
When therapeutic drugs such as Vioxx generate mass tort claims,
the decision-making processes of the drug company and government
regulators justifiably attract scrutiny and criticism from litigants, the
public at large, and legislators. 5 1 The Vioxx litigation shares many of
the features of other mass tort drug cases. Trial decision making and
public relations are heavily influenced by the recognition of complex
questions grounded in science and medicine; enormous economic
stakes presented by multiple plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions; great
uncertainty as to the likely long-run stock market reaction; and difficulty in assessing the potential size and number of punitive damage
awards. These concerns encourage clients and lawyers to look well
beyond the particular merits of individual cases. In these circumstances, the defense lawyer's representation is challenged by her close
economic and psychological identification with her corporate client,
while the plaintiffs' lawyer's judgment is influenced by the potential
economic and psychological impact of a settlement or verdict in connection with an individual client's case. In other words, the fate of
corporate counsel-both in-house and outside-is intertwined with
the results of mass tort litigation, and plaintiffs' counsel have a chance
to press or sacrifice the individual case in favor of the next case or
group of cases.
In an ordinary single tort case, the plaintiffs' lawyer's economic and
psychological interests rise and fall with the individual client's fate.
On the other hand, it is much easier in mass tort cases for the attorney
to separate his economic and emotional interests from those of an individual client.5 2 Consequently, mass tort cases require plaintiffs' lawyers to pay special attention to potential conflicts of interest and other
potential breaches of fiduciary duties, such as loyalty, confidentiality,
communication, and zealous advocacy. The defense attorney's role in
51. Many articles in recent years have described the FDA's weaknesses in performing its primary role of protecting the public from unsafe drugs. See, e.g., Allison M. Zieve & Brian
Wolfman, The FDA's Argument for EradicatingState Tort Law: Why It Is Wrong and Warrants
No Deference, 34 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 308 (2006).

52. See Hoyle, Jr., & Madeira, Jr., supra note 50, at 122:
In the last two decades ... a highly-organized and competent segment of the plaintiffs'
bar has focused on aggregation of cases with the goal of an ultimate class action settlement or a class trial. For these plaintiffs' counsel, individual trials of claims are a last
resort. Counsel for the aggregation plaintiffs acquire power that counsel for individual
plaintiffs lack, enhancing-and perhaps exaggerating-their clients' underlying rights.
Yet, individual plaintiffs' counsel serve the necessary purpose of pressing cases to trial
so that the value of the claims can be tested.
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mass tort cases also presents some troublesome issues, the most relevant of which is litigation control. Because of the large number of
claims, the corporate client is likely to play a significantly more active
role than usual micromanaging of the litigation to ensure that the tactics are consistent and effectively coordinated. Whether the adversary
system effectively promotes efficient compensation of individual consumers, improved judicial administration, and overall public safety has
been the subject of much public policy commentary, and the issue
warrants continued analysis and empirical study. The next Part discusses the core issues arising out of attorney-client relationships in
mass tort cases by describing and analyzing the trial tactics dominating
the Vioxx litigation to date.
IV.

LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT RULES OF LAW AND ETHICS

Does the existing adversarial process effectively protect and promote the public's interest in a legal system that resolves mass tort
claims fairly and efficiently when faced with a well-financed corporate
defendant who insists on a try-every-case strategy? Is it a satisfactory
answer that individual plaintiffs have an opportunity to be represented as part of an aggregated group by a well-financed and organized portion of the plaintiffs' bar? While plaintiffs' lawyers in the
Vioxx litigation fought valiantly for many years, the pragmatic settlement they entered, with draconian terms that separate them from
their clients who are unwilling to accept the proposed settlement,
demonstrates that the current legal system does not preserve a right to
individual compensation through means that promote both corrective
and social justice. 53 Neither does it promote the optimum deterrent:
the sale of unsafe products. The Vioxx litigation demonstrates the
danger in mass tort cases that parties and their attorneys may become
so focused on the long-range economic consequences of resolving ag53. I define "corrective justice" as a means by which to compel a party responsible for causing
harm to another to correct the situation through monetary compensation. One commentator
stated it succinctly: "I have a duty to repair your loss as a matter of corrective justice just because your loss is an outcome for which I am responsible." Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort
Theory, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 198 (2007). See also Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, id. at 214-49 (analyzing causation
rules and standards in light of the corrective justice theory); Jules L. Coleman, The Practiceof
Corrective Justice, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 15 (1995). I define "social justice" as the application of
substantive rules that promote the predominant values of the community for fairness in distribution of wealth and deterrence of violations of accepted social norms. For a discussion of social
justice in the context of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91

GEO. L.J. 513, 561 (2003); and Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, II, 38 TEX. L.
REV. 257 (1960).

See generally KOENING & RUSTAD, supra note 12.
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gregate cases that individual justice concerns are overwhelmed. 54 The
driving concern about aggregate cases dictates strategy and shapes the
nature of the lawyer-client relationship and trial tactics, making it unlikely that the tort litigation process will meet the basic goal of providing compensation to individuals who have suffered injury from the use
of Vioxx without being informed in advance of the drug's inherent
risks.
This Article advocates two remedies to properly adjust the rights
and interests of the parties in a mass tort case where a try-every-case
strategy is employed without a good-faith evaluation of each case:
Rule 11 sanctions 5 5 and an award of treble damages for bad-faith refusal to negotiate and settle individual cases. 56 The former may be
invoked under present law in the federal courts5 7 and most state jurisdictions; the latter requires new legislation aimed at mass tort litigation in most states. Many states have statutes or common law
decisions that provide for awards against insurance companies who
deny coverage in bad faith.5 8 Merck's strategy shows that there is reason to enact and apply similar statutes specifically tailored to mass tort
litigation and directed toward businesses that manufacture and distribute prescription drugs.
54. It is also true that mass tort claims, in general, induce courts to minimize the attention
they are willing to give to the impact a case might have on individual claimants. See Alexandra
D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: PreservingAdjudication in Complex Litigation,59 FLA.
L. REv. 383 (2007) (arguing that mass tort claims push courts toward claims administration instead of adjudication).
55. Rule 11 provides, in part, that a lawyer who files or advocates the support of a "pleading,
written motion, or other paper" certifies that factual allegations or denials are "warranted on the
evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Sanctions imposed under Rule 11 are not likely to serve as an
effective deterrent because they are discretionary and in most cases limited to costs and attorneys' fees. Rule 11, however, does reflect a perspective on the adversarial system that endorses
the notion that fairness and honesty outweigh trial gamesmanship. From the outset, this new
perspective has disturbed advocates of the traditional adversarial system. For example, see Justice Scalia's dissenting statement in response to the adoption of the Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1993, particularly Rule 11:
By placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to their clients-on their own initiative, and in a context where the lines between what must be
disclosed and what need not be disclosed are not clear but require the exercise of considerable judgment-the new Rule would place intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical
duty to represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side.
Amend. to Fed. R. Civ. P., 146 F.R.D. 402, 511 (1993).
56. See generally Mark I. Harrison & Samuel Langerman, Action Against Insurer for Bad
Faith Failure to Settle Claim, 21 AM. JUR. TRIALS 229 (2007).
57. In addition to Rule 11, federal courts have inherent power to award attorneys' fees for
bad-faith conduct in litigation. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
58. See id. For an example of a bad-faith statute applicable to unfair claim settlement practices, see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, § 3(9) (West 2007).
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Class actions, as presently conceived, are not available to Vioxx
consumers, because courts have determined that individual issues are
predominant over common issues. 59 While it is possible to certify a
class for settlement purposes only,60 such certification is not useful
when a defendant is determined not to settle any case. Informal aggregation of claims prosecuted by informal networks of plaintiffs and
their attorneys, which have worked in other mass tort cases, 61 will not
work if a corporation with vast resources insists upon a full trial in
each of 27,000 cases. Merck's strategy impacts lawyer-client relationships in a way that exacerbates the ethical problems faced by plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, particularly with respect to the duty of
candor to the court, the exercise of independent judgment, and the
duty of loyalty to clients. The applicable ethical rules do not prohibit
the roles played by the attorneys for both sides in the Vioxx litigation
in response to Merck's strategy. 62 Nevertheless, important questions

arise as to whether the manner in which the attorneys function promotes the predominant public interest of achieving individual and so63
cial justice.
Aggressive judicial enforcement of a lawyer's duty of candor to the
court will have some positive effect, but the overall impact on individ59. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006) (refusing to certify
a nationwide class of product liability claimants, reasoning that the unique factual issues
trumped any predominating issues). John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1995) (arguing that "defense counsel have
come to understand that the mass tort class action can be utilized to obtain cheap settlements
that pay little attention to the interests of certain structurally underrepresented classes of claimants"). See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the
Unrepresentedin Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439 (1996).
60. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (discussing criteria for settlement-only class action certifications and placing limits on the certification applicable to future
claimants); Lahav, supra note 54, at 418-24 (arguing that courts are more willing to certify settlement-only classes than litigation classes because settlement-only classes impose less of an administrative burden on the judiciary). For a discussion of the ethical rules and citations to articles
critically assessing common practices followed by counsel in aggregate settlements, see AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AoGREGATE LITIGATION, DISCUSSION DRAFT No. 2, ch. 3
(April 6, 2007) [hereinafter ALl DRAFr]. The ALl is currently reviewing and drafting principles
applicable to aggregate litigation. See Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute's Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Individual Clients Need or Want
Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395 (2008).

61. For a comprehensive review of informal networks in the prosecution of mass tort claims,
see Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 863.

62. See ALl DRAFT, supra note 60 (requiring full disclosure of all material terms of proposed
settlements, including the distribution to each plaintiff).
63. For perspectives on the risks of improper representation of individuals in mass tort cases,
see Coffee, Jr., supra note 59; Koniak, supra note 59; and Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 59.
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ual and social justice will be minimal. A lawyer's duty to assess the
impact of her client's positions and tactics on the promotion of justice
remains a subject of contention within the profession. 64 However, the
prevailing view is that the lawyer's duties of loyalty, confidentiality,
and zealous advocacy trump her duty to promote justice. That conception of the lawyer's role in the litigation process makes it doubtful
that effective solutions to the problem will emerge if the solutions
sought focus only on the lawyer-client relationship. It will require a
significant change in the culture of the adversarial system for us to
develop a different balance between the lawyer's interest in promoting social justice and her duty to win.
The first step toward achieving a different balance occurred when
federal courts adopted procedures compelling mandatory disclosure
of information to one's adversary, 65 but, to date, it does not appear
that other radical changes in the role of lawyer-advocates are likely.
The rules of ethics, which place primary emphasis on a lawyer's duties
of confidentiality and zealous advocacy, rest on the fundamental belief
that the best way to achieve justice in a civil case is to provide tools for
each side to access and present evidence to the court and jury from
the biased perspective of adverse litigants. In mass tort cases, a tryevery-case approach conflicts with the fundamental goals of the tort
system: to promote deterrence, correctional justice, and social justice.
Policymakers cannot provide an effective remedy to control such corporate conduct by changing the rules of ethics applicable to lawyers
without upsetting other important values promoted by ethical rules.
Instead, controlling the try-every-case strategy will require policymakers to adopt and enforce strong economic disincentives that outweigh
the short-range benefits motivating the use of tactics relying upon litigants' disparate economic resources.
V.

Vioxx

LITIGATION: THE

DUTY

OF CANDOR TO THE COURT

Merck's trial tactics in the Vioxx litigation define the fundamental
relationships of lawyers and clients. Merck made a business decision
based on a cost-benefit assessment of the mass of tort cases, and, consequently, the judgments of its trial lawyers are not based on an assessment of the merits of defending a particular case but instead are
dictated by the overall corporate litigation strategy. While the defense of an individual case in all mass tort litigation is necessarily
64. See Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908
Canons, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1999) (reviewing the contemporary debate and relating the
history and jurisprudential background of the 1908 ABA committee debate).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a).
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guided by a general corporate strategy, the decision to not make candid assessments of whether an individual case warrants settlement
poses some potential ethical problems for defense counsel that do not
exist in other mass tort cases. Similarly, because the defendant has
publicized its try-every-case strategy, plaintiffs' counsel are not in a
position to offer meaningful advice to individual clients as to whether
a settlement or an alternative dispute resolution may be in their best
interests. The main ethical guidelines that should engage a lawyer's
attention in the Vioxx litigation are the duties of exercising independent judgment, presenting candor to the court, and maintaining loyalty to the client. This Part briefly addresses these ethical issues. The
ethical duty most pertinent to the present discussion is the duty of
66
candor to the court.
Merck's Vioxx litigation strategy sharply defines and limits the role
of counsel for both plaintiffs and the defendant. By publicly declaring
that it will not pursue a group settlement strategy or consider settlement of any case, Merck limited the role of its outside counsel to trying cases. With such a specifically defined role, defense counsel are
circumscribed or eliminated from their customary role of evaluating
each case on its merits and deciding whether to recommend a settlement or trial strategy. Moreover, public statements made by defense
counsel must be consistent with Merck's strategy before, during, and
after the trial.
To assess the ethics of Merck's lawyers implementing this strategy,
it is helpful to consider Rule 3.3(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct mandating candor to the court. This Rule provides
in part that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer....
[or] (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."' 67 This rule
makes it clear that, while the system places great weight on the adversarial process's ability to reveal the truth, it must limit zealous advo68
cacy to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process.
66. In addition to Rule 2.2 of the Model Rules, discussed below, Rule 3.1 is relevant to the
duty of candor. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004). Rule 3.1 provides in part

that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a goodfaith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Id.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2004).

68. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility adopts the same balance between zealous
advocacy and the duty of candor, providing that a lawyer may not "[flile a suit, or assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1986).
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Consider the case of a plaintiff who uses Vioxx for more than eighteen months and suffers a stroke though she has minimal factors in
her medical history, other than the use of Vioxx, that present a significant risk of stroke. 69 Once her lawyers file a complaint, defense counsel confronts a risk of failing to comply with the rule demanding
candor and the rules forbidding the presentation of evidence known
to be false at the following stages of the litigation: filing an answer to
the complaint; preparing and filing affidavits in response to a motion
for summary judgment; retaining expert witnesses and presenting
their testimony; and presenting the testimony of Merck's science employees and managers. A recent article reporting on the success of
Merck's litigation strategy emphasized that not one Vioxx claimant
has received compensation for an alleged Vioxx-induced injury and
offered the following statement from one of Merck's attorneys:
"Merck had not yet found a single case where it believed that Vioxx
caused a heart attack. ' 70 The attorney also noted that heart attacks
71
are common in many people.
It is highly improbable that Merck's evaluation of the Vioxx claims
persuaded the company that there were no meritorious claims among
27,000 cases. 72 While the public posturing of Merck's officials was
consistent with their litigation strategy, if one of Merck's attorneys
made a similar statement to the judge-that Merck found no case
where Vioxx caused a claimant's heart attack-a serious question
would have emerged as to whether the attorney was fulfilling her duty
of candor to the court. It is one thing to assert that Merck has not
identified a case that it cannot offer a meritorious lack of causation or
damages defense. It is quite another to assert that Merck's investigation has not identified any case where the evidence persuaded its experts that Vioxx caused a heart attack. In the same vein, it is one
thing to play a semantic game with the press, using language like
"where Merck believed that Vioxx caused a heart attack. ' 73 However, at some point in the adversarial process-through discovery and
trials-evidence will likely show that the strategy of denying every
69. For example, one article highlighted Joseph Farrell, a fifty-nine-year-old insurance broker
who had not decided whether he would accept the settlement. Emphasizing the need for some
retribution, he asserted that he was induced to take Vioxx based on Merck's advertising and
took it for three years before having two heart attacks. "He did not smoke, had low cholesterol,
and his family lacked a history of heart disease." Stark, supra note 3.
70. Berenson, supra note 3.
71. Id.
72. A more candid and accurate picture of Merck's assessments of the merits of the various
cases is revealed by its designation of qualified participants in the November 9, 2007 settlement
agreement. See Merck Settlement, supra note 1.
73. Berenson, supra note 3.
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claim and trying every case conflicts directly with the truth-seeking
goal of litigation as reinforced by the duty of candor to the tribunal.
The only question is whether the rules, as drafted, allow a court to
demand the kinds of disclosure that the duty of candor to the court
contemplates-even if that candor is limited to discussions in chambers that are not publicly disclosed.
Merck has the right to insist that plaintiffs in each case present sufficient evidence to prove, more probably than not, that Merck sold Vioxx with an inadequate warning and that Vioxx caused their injuries.
However, if there were not a large number of similar claims, Merck
would likely acknowledge to the court during the pretrial process that
the evidence in a particular case has enough potential to persuade a
jury of Merck's liability. At that time, it makes sense to engage in
good-faith settlement discussions. Indeed, the tort system manages to
dispose of the vast majority of cases without trial, because of the culture, legal rules, and ethical rules that allow the court to penetrate
claims and defenses and distinguish among the cases that warrant dismissal, trial, or effort on the part of the court to encourage a settlement. By refusing to engage in a good-faith evaluation of each case
and participate in candid discussions with the court, Merck may skillfully walk the line governing permissible trial tactics. However, this
delays individuals' rights to the just resolution of their claims, and the
costs to litigants and the public are significantly increased. The honest
answer provided to the court as to why Merck is unwilling to settle
any case is that a settlement will impact negatively on other cases and
the overall resolution of the mass tort. Some mechanism of deterrence is necessary, and an award of treble damages may serve as an
effective and justifiable tool to promote the public goals of economic
efficiency, corrective justice, and social justice.
The effect of Merck's strategy on the plaintiffs' attorney-client relationships impacts every critical phase of the litigation. Merck likely
anticipated and desired these effects when it adopted the strategy.
The primary goal was to make attorneys more cautious and thoughtful
about accepting and filing Vioxx cases by raising the cost of litigation
and lowering the expectation of recovery. Inducing a more careful
evaluation of cases is consistent both with the public interest in promoting individual and social justice, as well as with ethical rules. From
the initial evaluation and decision to accept an individual's case
through the final stages of settlement negotiations or trial, the plaintiffs' attorney also owes a duty of candor to the court.
Just as Merck knows that all 27,000 cases are not meritless, plaintiffs' lawyers know that some of the cases lack merit or present more
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difficult evidentiary or statute of limitations problems than others.
During case evaluations, it is more likely than not that some of the
accepted cases did not receive the kind of detailed review and evaluation that the plaintiffs' lawyer would like when accepting or rejecting a
case involving serious personal injuries. At some point in the process,
the court will compel candor from both Merck and the client.
However, Merck's strategy has likely had an impact on both the
number of plaintiffs' attorneys who have represented clients, as well
as the number of claims. An attorney's loss of business need not be a
cause for concern. But close attention should be paid to whether individual citizens are being denied the opportunity to find competent
counsel to prosecute their claims as a result of the court system, the
tactics of the litigants, and the manner in which lawyers practice. In
the Vioxx litigation, as in most mass tort situations, plaintiffs' lawyers
agree to cooperate in some manner, ranging from filing class actions,
forming lead counsel committees to conduct discovery, or even simply
sharing information. In most situations, a number of local attorneys
keep cases they intend to litigate personally. Because most mass tort
cases involve a well-financed corporate defendant, attorneys recognize that litigation costs are likely to be huge-it is unlikely that one
can litigate an individual drug liability case for less than $100,000and the anticipated cost of financing the litigation, along with the
work hours required to competently represent the client, leads most
attorneys to refer the case to a firm in a better financial position.
Given Merck's public litigation position, it is likely that more cases
than usual were referred and that counsel for the litigants on both
sides were working with substantial financial resources. To the extent
that is true, one could conclude that Merck's strategy has laid the
groundwork for a more efficient resolution of the litigation by encouraging the pooling of cases so that there are fewer decision-makers to
address, at least in terms of plaintiffs' attorneys. However, it is also
likely that many potential clients who were turned away were either
poor, racial minorities, or both. Those clients probably presented the
lowest chance of winning their cases, because they were more likely to
have had multiple health problems prior to taking Vioxx. 74
The plaintiffs' lawyer who has accumulated multiple clients in the
Vioxx litigation faces many ethical and economic issues common to
mass tort litigation. 75 As Judge Weinstein noted, these issues include
74. See

INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,

UNEQUAL TREATMENT:

CONFRONTING RA-

(Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2002).
75. See, e.g., Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk
and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and CollecCIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE
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loyalty to the client, confidentiality, and zealous advocacy. 76 Performing these duties for one client risks breaching that duty to another.
Informed consent becomes a critical feature of the lawyer-client relationship in this situation. The ethical problem highlighted by Merck's
strategy is that plaintiffs' attorneys have a heightened duty to separate
and classify their cases based on their relative strengths and weaknesses-in terms of the persuasiveness of the proof as to causation
and inadequate warnings so that stronger cases are presented for trial
first. In the absence of a try-every-case policy, it is likely that some
cases in the group would be pushed for settlement, mediation, or early
trial if the individuals were represented by individual counsel. The
availability of settlement or alternative dispute resolution may be particularly important to some of the claimants based on their personal,
financial, or emotional needs. These potential conflicts among clients
exist in every mass tort situation where individuals are represented as
part of a group. However, Merck's public position regarding its trial
strategy diminishes the ability of counsel to respond to individual client needs or desires. The terms that Merck bargained for and obtained in the settlement agreement leave no doubt that Merck was
successful in convincing plaintiffs' attorneys to sacrifice the interests
of individual clients for what they saw as the only practical way to
promote the overall good of the group as a whole.
In short, Merck's litigation strategy and the plaintiffs' attorneys' response to it promoted the economic interests of Merck, the plaintiffs'
attorneys, and some of the plaintiffs' clients, while clearly leaving a
significant number of individual plaintiffs to fend for themselves.
From a moral and public policy perspective, this result warrants a
77
more critical examination.
VI.

THE MORAL CONSIDERATIONS

One of the most interesting junctures in a first-year torts course occurs when students read cases where courts announce that an individual does not have a duty to come to the aid of another who is in
danger and, therefore, cannot be held legally accountable for serious
tives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 432 (1998) (noting that "little by way of rules or case
law guides courts in sorting out the relationships among clients and the many lawyers within
mass tort group litigation").
76. WEINSTEIN, supra note 12.

77. This Article focuses on Merck. The ethical and moral issues of the settlement agreement
that the plaintiffs' attorneys entered are important and complex enough to require a separate
article that I plan to write in the future.
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harm suffered by another that could have been avoided. 78 The notion
that law does not compel moral behavior does not sit well with large
numbers of students. The reactions of disillusioned students may be
tempered somewhat by noting that the law does not forbid people
from engaging in moral conduct to aid others, and, if members of the
community regard conduct as immoral, there are ways of attaching
social and economic consequences to that behavior. 79 Law students
and lawyers should not stop thinking about and developing techniques
to promote moral behavior just because specific laws do not demand
moral conduct.
Moreover, this morality discussion encourages students to think
about the roles and responsibilities of lawyers to press for changes in
law that make it more consistent with community values. In recent
years, several commentators have urged critical rethinking about the
roles lawyers play in using the law to promote social change. For example, Professor Haddon urged law schools to consider the importance of training lawyers to promote public values such as equality. 80
Judge Harry Edwards criticized law schools for focusing on legal theories to the exclusion of practical knowledge and emphasized the obligation of a lawyer to serve the public good.81 Professor Rosenbaum
took lawyers and lawmakers to task for not pushing the law toward
greater compatibility with morality and spirituality, proposing an alternative paradigm for the legal system that explicitly endorses moral
judgments in connection with evaluating the law and resolving legal
82
conflicts.
78. For an enlightening discussion of the way tort law approaches the duty problem, see
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 439 (1994).
79. For an interesting argument that the legal rule excusing a person from a duty to aid others
is consistent with prevailing moral standards, see Alan Calnan, Reasonableness, Justice and the
No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule of Torts (June 11, 2007), available at http:l/ssrn.com/abstract=993118.
For example, economic and social levers were important instruments of the civil rights movement in the 1960s when victims of discrimination lacked political power and the support of the
existing law.
80. Phoebe A. Haddon, Educationfor a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH. L. REV.
573, 574 (1994).
81. Harry T. Edwards, Remark, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1148 (1990); see also Mary Ann Dantuono, A Citizen Lawyer's Moral, Religious, and Professional Responsibilityfor the Administration of Justicefor the Poor, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383
(1998) (arguing that religious traditions require members to work collectively to make society
respond to the needs of the poor, and a lawyer who professes to that religious belief has a special
obligation to use her legal skills in that regard).
82. Rosenbaum argues that courts should strive to provide moral remedies such as seeking an
apology from a person who has caused harm to another and seeking to restore relationships. He
argues that such moral remedies would work to the benefit of the entire community. THANE
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Merck's public statements and litigation strategy reflect its view of
fulfilling its fiduciary duty to shareholders, but they show little regard
for the public that trusted Merck enough to pay for its product.
Merck's litigation conduct toward Vioxx consumers, however, is at
best indifferent and at worst callous. Millions of consumers used the
product, believing that it would treat their pain. At the same time,
these consumers were unaware that Vioxx subjected them to a significantly increased risk of suffering a heart attack or stroke. Merck cannot argue in good faith that there are no meritorious claims among the
27,000 filed. This is not a mass tort case, such as In re Bendectin Litigation, where the drug manufacturer may argue that scientific evidence does not support a causal link between its drug and the
claimant's injuries. 83 Studies clearly show an increased risk of heart
attack and stroke among persons who have used Vioxx for more than
eighteen months.8 4 The best Merck can do is argue that each individual case requires careful analysis to make a good-faith judgment as to
whether Vioxx caused the individual's injuries. By shifting away from
questions of legal and fiduciary duties, the fundamental issue arises
whether litigants and attorneys in mass tort cases continue to have
obligations as public citizens to engage in morally acceptable behavior
toward one another.
The adversarial process does not justify a corporation that knows its
product caused injuries to large numbers of consumers to use all of its
resources in an effort to avoid paying any of them-particularly where
the evidence shows that the manufacturer devoted enormous resources to persuading consumers to use the product without adequately communicating the drug's true risks. This Article does not
argue that Merck, or any manufacturer faced with mass tort claims,
lacks the right to defend itself in court. Clearly, the adversarial system
does not contemplate one side to a controversy failing to vigorously
advocate her position. However, functioning as a zealous advocate
does not-and should not-shield a party's conduct from evaluation
from a moral perspective. In mass tort actions based on products such
as Vioxx that certainly have caused substantial harm to a significant
number of consumers, good moral conduct requires a good-faith effort to evaluate individual claims and attempt to reach a fair settlement in any case that warrants a finding of causation between the use
ROSENBAUM, THE

MYTH

OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS TO

Do

WHAT'S

RIGHT 39 (2004).

83. 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988) (submitting representative cases to a jury to determine
whether the evidence showed that Bendectin caused birth defects).
84. See MARTIN REPORT, supra note 30.
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of the drug and an injury. In other words, possessing the resources to
litigate every case in a mass of tort cases does not make it morally
acceptable to employ those resources to delay and avoid fairly compensating people who are suffering from heart attacks, strokes, and
deaths that the product clearly caused. Such conduct would not be
morally acceptable from a trucking company whose driver ran off the
road and injured large numbers of individuals, and it is not morally
acceptable from a drug company.
Merck has both a moral and legal right to contest any claim that it
genuinely believes lacks merit. However, a morally acceptable strategy entails a declaration to consumers that they may either stay in the
litigation process and try their cases or participate in an alternative
dispute resolution that the company makes available to claimants who
meet specific threshold requirements that establish a colorable claim.
Courts should have the power to impose substantial monetary penalties for the parties' failure to conduct good-faith evaluations and settlement negotiations.
The public has an interest in both the truth about the risks associated with prescription drugs and the compensation of individuals who
may have suffered serious injuries from their use. As Judge Weinstein
emphasized, mass tort litigation presents stakes that go far beyond individual litigants and extend to the community as a whole.8 5 Moreover, there is a compelling need to raise and explore the ethical and
moral questions in light of the litigants' concerted use of the media to
influence public opinion about the merits of Vioxx lawsuits. Assuming any corporation insists on the strategy of not acknowledging responsibility in any case without a full trial, the courts must have tools
that compel the defendant to conduct good-faith case evaluations and
make good-faith settlement offers.
Some will argue that Merck's efforts to settle the Vioxx litigation
under the terms of the proposed November 9 settlement agreement
show that Merck's try-every-case strategy should not be condemned
as immoral. Rather than denying and disregarding the rights of its
consumers, it represents an efficient manner of inducing the plaintiffs
and their lawyers to assess their losses more realistically and engage in
fair settlement discussions. However, that argument requires one to
assess the results in terms of the global settlement only. If one moves
from a global view to look at the effects of the settlement on individuals who seek either fair compensation or a day in court, it is apparent
that many individuals have been hurt a lot more than they have been
85. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 12.
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helped. Because the vast majority of plaintiffs' lawyers agreed to recommend settlement to all of their clients even though the compensation represents a small fraction of individual verdict expectancies, it is
difficult to support any conclusion other than that Merck's strategy
has lowered the compensation claims by encouraging plaintiffs' attorneys to sacrifice individuals for the good of the masses and the economic investments of the attorneys. This resolution is pragmatic and
defensible, only because the tort system presently operates in a manner that allows a wealthy defendant to take advantage of its slow
movement and high expenses, without concern about significant economic penalties for failing to engage in good-faith evaluations and settlement negotiations of meritorious individual cases among the mass.
VII.

TORT LAW, ECONOMICS, AND

AMERICAN CULTURE

In order for communities to remain healthy, there must be an accepted process for holding individuals and businesses accountable for
86
causing serious harm to others. Sometimes, an apology is sufficient.
In most cases involving serious personal injuries, the most important
goal in the American cultural and legal system is to determine
whether the victim is entitled to compensation as a means of achieving
corrective justice. In mass tort cases, the issues require consideration
of not only corrective justice, but also social justice in light of the large
numbers of people who have suffered losses that may require financial, social, and emotional support from family, friends, and others.
With respect to injuries caused by the use of products, the consumer
protection movements of the past four decades have reflected the
widespread community opinion that corporations should be honest
with consumers about the risks and benefits of products and should
pay for harm caused by defective products. 87 The law reflected and
explained the consumer demand for safety and compensation by eliminating legal barriers to identifying the business that should be held
accountable and changing the standard of liability from negligence to
strict liability. 8 Although the consumer safety perspective has been
86. See generally AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY (2004): Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We
Know and Don't Know About the Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1009 (2005): Ann J. Kellett. Comment, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of
Apology and Mediation in Disputes Between Physicians and Patients, 1987 Mo. J. DsP. RESOL.
111.

87. See MARSHALL S.SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 86-95 (2003) (arguing that, by the
1960s, a combination of factors created a change in attitudes about what constitutes justice with
respect to claims for compensation in cases of product injuries).
88. Judge Traynor's succinct statement of the rationale of strict liability law in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963), remains true today: "The purpose of
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subject to vigorous challenges from political and economic conservatives, courts have stood fast on the standards and justifications deterring the sale of defective products and compensating consumers
injured by these products. 89
The law of strict liability is also a reflection of the strand of American culture that empowers individuals to seek redress for wrongs committed by the rich and powerful by invoking the economic and
political power of the community. This focus on individual power is
protected by the federal and state constitutions in part by the preservation of the right to a jury trial. This right ensures that, in most important disputes and conflicts, the average member of the community
will have the power to ultimately say who is right and who is wrong.
The combination of judicial restructuring of legal doctrine to include
strict liability as a justification for shifting the costs of accidents and
the potential resolution of personal injury claims by juries has functioned as a major source of economic and social relief in the modern
American economy.
Merck's strategy in the Vioxx cases appears on the surface to be
compatible with, and respectful of, the legal standards governing its
marketing of products and the resolution of injury claims. In reality,
the strategy directly conflicts with the goals underlying the strict liability system. Faced with the prospect of trying every case in a court
system that lacks that capacity in a mass tort situation, most tort victims will have justice delayed beyond the time where monetary compensation may fulfill a meaningful corrective function. In other
words, Merck's strategy relies upon the fact that a large number of
people may have been hurt by the product as a justification for delaying a resolution of their compensation claim for such a long period of
time that very few will receive compensation fast enough to make a
difference in their lives.
To address the goal of individual justice in the face of a rich defendant's resolve to litigate every case in a mass of claims, policymakers
may need to either change the rules applicable to class actions or aggressively impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of
litigants and their counsel to evaluate and attempt to settle individual
cases. A party with extraordinary resources acquired through the
such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by
the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves."
89. See, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pnuematic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997) (discussing the
conflict among the drafters of the Third Restatement of Torts, commentators, and courts about
the proper way of determining whether a product has a design defect).
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mass marketing of a defective product should not be able to maximize
its profits in the marketplace by delaying the removal of, or warning
about, dangerous products and then use those resources to delay the
resolution of tort claims or make the process so costly that access to
court is effectively denied. To allow this result permits a manufacturer
or seller of mass consumer goods to use economic power to undermine the goals of product liability law that have been embraced by the
country and the culture over the past forty years. In effect, the successful use of a try-every-case tactic ultimately allows a corporation
that sold defective products around the world to define the scope and
extent of its liability for the sale of defective products.
Courts, legislatures, and the bar should explore changes in the legal
process and the roles of lawyers that aim to reduce the effectiveness of
this strategy. The most efficient and effective approach may lie in the
enactment of statutes that provide for an award of treble damages
against a recalcitrant defendant who fails to make a good-faith effort
to settle a tort case in a timely manner. 90 The law of bad faith as
applied to insurance companies is well developed and offers great potential as a tool to encourage wealthy corporate defendants in mass
tort cases to engage in good-faith evaluations of claims, defenses, and
settlement negotiations. 91 For example, Massachusetts law includes
unfair settlement practices under its definition of "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the business of insurance. ' '92 An "unfair claim settlement practice" includes "[r]efusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation" 93 or "[flailing to effectuate
prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has
become reasonably clear."' 94 The award against an insurer who engages in bad-faith practices may be increased in relation to the degree
of wrongfulness of the insurer's litigation-related conduct. For example, courts may award double damages for the negligent failure to
honor a claim and treble damages for the willful failure to honor a
claim. 95 Another approach worth pursuing is some form of
mandatory pretrial arbitration process, wherein a third party evaluates
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, § 3(9)(m) (West 2007).

91. See generally Harrison & Langerman, supra note 56.
92. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, § 3(9) (West 2007).

93. § 3(9)(d).
94. § 3(9)(f).
95. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming a Massachusetts
trial court's holding that an insurer committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice by failing to
effectuate a settlement after liability became reasonably clear; an award of double damages and
attorneys' fees was justified due to the insurer's knowing and willful breach of the duty of good
faith).
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the merits of the claims and defenses and makes 'the evaluation available to the court for use in promoting settlement negotiations. In addition, the third party's neutral evaluation should be considered in
connection with an assessment of whether the defendant has acted in
bad faith.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Vioxx litigation may produce new insights regarding whether
mass torts can be fairly and efficiently handled by the traditional tort
system and lawyer-client relationships. If the November 9 settlement
is effectuated, it will set a precedent that rewards a litigation strategy
of exhausting the resources and will of plaintiffs' attorneys and courts
in order to induce global settlements that fail to fairly and adequately
compensate individuals with serious injuries. If the proposed settlement fails to receive the support of the required number of plaintiffs
and Merck insists on the trial of thousands of cases before it is willing
to acknowledge responsibility, the resulting trials will reveal whether
groups of plaintiffs' lawyers with millions of dollars can effectively
protect the rights of thousands of victims who are opposed by the full
force of a billion-dollar corporation, without the advantages that come
with class action certification.
This Article contends that Vioxx litigation will most likely demonstrate that the established way of providing legal services to mass tort
victims no longer works to provide compensation to individual victims
who merit corrective justice. If this contention proves correct, the justice system will need to explore changes to the ways in which tort
victims get representation, the manner in which courts process mass
tort claims, and the manner in which lawyers and corporations are
expected to fulfill their duties as public citizens in the face of mass tort
actions. Judges should take aggressive action in demanding honest
and candid assessments of the merits of individual claims at an early
stage in the litigation, the use of alternative dispute resolution in
which the court may compel the parties to participate before having
the opportunity to try the case, and an award of double or treble damages against a defendant who fails to make a good-faith effort to investigate and evaluate. There is no justification for forcing the court
to serve as a facilitator for parties who refuse to honestly and candidly
evaluate the merits of a claim or defense before insisting on a trial in
mass tort cases.
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